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The Application of Collateral Estoppel to Markman 
Rulings: The Search for Logical and Effective Preclusion 
of Patent Claim Constructions 
 




In TM Patents, L.P. v. IBM Corp.,1 the Southern District 
Court of New York had the opportunity to promulgate the 
appropriate preclusion standard for patent claims interpreted 
in previous litigation.2  Numerous district courts have found 
the creation of an effective and logical set of preclusion 
standards for prior Markman3 rulings an extremely difficult 
task.  The TM Patents decision, which held that collateral 
estoppel applied to prior patent claim construction,4 was 
quickly criticized.  For example, in Graco Children’s Products v. 
Regalo Int’l LLC,5 the Eastern District Court of Pennsylvania 
refused to follow the reasoning or holding of the TM Patents 
court.6  The court in Graco held that to bind a party to a prior 
court ruling where that party did not have an opportunity or an 
incentive to appeal is unjust.7  This view sharply contrasts with 
the rationale behind the TM Patents decision, which defers to 
 
 *  J.D. candidate, University of Minnesota, 2002. B.S. Electrical and 
Computer Engineering, University of Wisconsin-Madison.  Mr. Le Duc is a 
former Naval Nuclear Submarine Officer. 
 1. 72 F. Supp. 2d 370 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).  The court held that the earlier 
resolution of specific patent claims by another court, during a Markman 
hearing in which the patent holder was afforded a full and fair opportunity to 
litigate the meaning of the claims, was binding on the patent holder in the 
subsequent litigation.  It did not matter that the parties settled during trial.  
See id. at 375. 
 2. See id. at 375. 
 3. See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370 (1996).  
The Supreme Court held that the construction of a patent claim is a question 
of law to be determined by the judge, not a question of fact to be determined by 
a jury.  See id. at 391.  See also infra notes 50-52 and accompanying text. 
 4. See TM Patents, 72 F. Supp. 2d at 379. 
 5. 77 F. Supp. 2d 660 (E.D. Pa. 1999). 
 6. See id. at 663-65. 
 7. See id. at 664-65. 
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judicial economy and the mitigation of unnecessary litigation.8  
The weighing of justice and judicial economy has rendered a 
divisive split between the lower courts concerning whether 
collateral estoppel should apply to Markman rulings.9 
This Note seeks to support the Eastern District Court of 
Pennsylvania’s holding in Graco,10 along with other recent 
rulings that support that court’s reasoning and disagree with 
the TM Patents decision, and urges that the blanket application 
of collateral estoppel to patent claim construction of previous 
litigation is unjustified and illogical.  Part I establishes the 
relevant background of issue preclusion and patent claim 
construction law.  Part I also discusses the history and holdings 
of TM Patents and Graco.  Part II analyzes the two holdings 
with respect to recent decisions.  In addition, Part II discusses 
possible solutions to resolve the current, increasing division of 
authority. 
Although TM Patents does contain significant policy 
justifications, this Note concludes that the TM Patents court 
has generated a significant legal controversy by promulgating 
ineffective and unjust law.  If followed, TM Patents will 
increase rather than reduce litigation, further burdening the 
judicial system.  This is exactly the opposite of that decision’s 
objective.  Accordingly, this Note encourages the adoption of 
the well-reasoned principles for which the Graco decision 
stands.  The Note concludes that in order to strike an 
appropriate balance between judicial economy and 
fundamental fairness, collateral estoppel of Markman rulings 
should only apply if interlocutory appeals-of-right are available 







 8. See TM Patents, 72 F. Supp. 2d at 376. 
 9. See Kollmorgen Corp. v. Yaskawa Elect. Corp., 147 F. Supp. 2d 464, 
467-70 (W.D. Va. 2001) (district court rejected the TM Patents decision); 
Louisville Bedding Co. v. Perfect Fit Indus., 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9599 at 
*11 and n.2 (W.D. Ky. June 25, 2001) (district court supported the TM Patents 
decision). 
 10. See Graco Children’s Prods., 77 F. Supp. 2d at 665 (holding that 
collateral estoppel will not apply to Markman rulings of prior litigation whose 
final decision was precluded by settlement). 
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I.  BACKGROUND 
 
A. THE DOCTRINE OF COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL 
 
Issue preclusion, otherwise referred to as collateral 
estoppel, prevents parties from contesting matters litigated and 
decided during prior litigation.11  There are four requirements 
that must be met before collateral estoppel applies.  “First, the 
issues raised in both proceedings must be identical.”12  Second, 
during the prior proceeding, the issue must have been fully 
litigated and decided.13  Third, the party against whom estoppel 
is to be applied must have had a full and fair opportunity to 
litigate the issue in a previous proceeding.14  Fourth, resolution 
of the issue must have been essential to a final and valid 
judgment on the merits.15  The doctrine is to promote judicial 
economy by precluding relitigation of previously decided 
issues,16 and the court has some discretion in determining 
whether issue preclusion is appropriate.17  However, the 
application of collateral estoppel is not proper where it would 
be unfair to either party.18 
One of the leading patent claim construction cases dealing 
with collateral estoppel is A.B. Dick Co. v. Burroughs Corp.19  
The court in A.B Dick declined to give preclusive effect to 
statements it had made in previous litigation concerning the 
 
 11. See TM Patents, 72 F. Supp. 2d at 375. 
 12. Id. 
 13. See id. 
 14. See id. 
 15. See id.  (citing Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Empresa Naviera 
Santa, 56 F.3d 359, 368 (2d Cir. 1995)). 
 16. See Home Diagnostics, Inc. v. LifeScan, Inc., 120 F. Supp. 2d 864, 866 
(N.D. Cal. 2000).  Specifically, collateral estoppel “precludes a plaintiff from 
relitigating identical issues by merely ‘switching adversaries.’”  Parklane 
Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 329 (1979) (citing Bernhard v. Bank of Am. 
Nat’l Trust & Savings Ass’n, 122 P.2d 892, 895 (Cal. 1942)).  Additionally, a 
plaintiff is precluded “from asserting a claim that the plaintiff had previously 
litigated and lost against another defendant.”  Id. 
 17. See A.B. Dick Co. v. Burroughs Corp., 713 F.2d 700, 702 (Fed. Cir. 
1983). 
 18. See id.  “For example, offensive use of collateral estoppel, where a 
plaintiff seeks to estop a defendant from relitigating issues the defendant 
previously litigated and lost against another plaintiff, should not be allowed 
where it would be unfair to the defendant.”  Id. (citing Parklane Hosiery, 439 
U.S. at 331). 
 19. Id. 
300 MINNESOTA INTELL. PROP. REVIEW [Vol. 3:297 
 
scope of a patent.20  It reasoned that those statements were not 
essential to the previous litigation’s outcome and therefore they 
should not be given preclusive effect in the subsequent action.21  
The court was also convinced that it would be unfair to give a 
claim construction ruling, unessential to the final judgment, 
collateral estoppel effect.22  After completing a lengthy 
balancing test of various factors for and against issue 
preclusion of prior claim construction, the court concluded that 
judicial statements pertaining to the scope of the patent should 
be narrowly construed.23  Additionally, the court stated that 
statements would be granted preclusive effect in subsequent 
litigation only if the determination of the breadth of the claims 
was essential to a final judgment, either on the question of 
infringement or validity, in that prior litigation.24  Thus, broad 
statements regarding the scope of the patent that are 
inessential to a final judgment do not receive preclusive effect.25 
 
B. PATENT CLAIM CONSTRUCTION AND MARKMAN RULINGS 
 
The question of whether the interpretation of a patent 
claim is a matter of law or fact was decided by the Supreme 
Court in the landmark decision Markman v. Westview 
Instruments, Inc.26  Congress is empowered by the Constitution 
to further the progress of science by granting inventors the 
exclusive right to economically exploit their innovations for a 
limited time.27  Accordingly, Congress exercised this authority 
 
 20. See id. at 704. 
 21. See id.  Furthermore, the court noted that “[e]xcept in the context of 
validity or infringement, judicial statements regarding the scope of patent 
claims are hypothetical insofar as they purport to resolve the question of 
whether prior art or products not before the court would, respectively, 
anticipate or infringe the patent claims.”  Id. 
 22. See id. 
 23. See id. 
 24. See id. 
 25. See id. 
 26. See Markman v. Westview Instuments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 372 (1996).  
The main issue was whether the legal construction of a patent claim, the 
“portion of the patent document that defines the scope of the patentee’s rights, 
is a matter of law reserved entirely for the court, or subject to a Seventh 
Amendment guarantee that a jury will determine the meaning of any disputed 
term of art about which expert testimony is offered.”  Id. 
 27. See id. at 373.  “The Constitution empowers Congress [t]o promote the 
Progress of Science and the useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to 
Authors and Inventors the exclusive right to their respective Writings and 
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in 1790 by granting “inventors ‘the right to exclude others from 
making, using, offering for sale, selling, or importing the 
patented invention’ in exchange for full disclosure of an 
invention.”28 
In general, a patent must define the exact scope of an 
invention and its manufacture.  This is designed to secure for 
the inventor all to which he is entitled and to provide the public 
with notice of what subject matter is still available for the 
taking.29  These dual objectives have come to be served by two 
separate components of a patent document.30  First, the 
specification of a patent describes the invention in clear and 
concise language such that one skilled in the art is able to 
make the same invention.31  Second, a patent document 
includes one or more claims which specifically detail the subject 
matter that the prospective patentee regards as the 
innovation.32  The claims define the scope of the patent grant 
and forbid the precise copying of an invention.33  Also forbidden 
as infringement are products that make trivial changes so that 
they effectively duplicate the previous invention without 
copying the literal language of the previous claim.34  Patent 
lawsuits normally charge infringement.  To obtain relief, the 
patent holder must prove that his “patent claim covers the 
alleged infringer’s product or process.”35  Thus, in order to prove 
infringement, it is necessary to first determine the meaning 
and the scope of the claim language.36 
The Court in Markman addressed whether patent claim 
construction is a question of law or fact.37  Previously, “issues of 
claim construction were submitted to a jury.”38  The right of 
trial by jury, guaranteed by the Seventh Amendment, existed 
during the colonial era under English common law.39  Finding 
 
Discoveries.”  Id. (quoting the U.S. CONST. Art. I, § 8, cl. 8). 
 28. Id. (quoting H.Schwartz, PATENT LAW AND PRACTICE 33 (2d ed. 
1995)). 
 29. See McClain v. Ortmayer, 141 U.S. 419, 424 (1891). 
 30. See Markman, 517 U.S. at 373. 
 31. See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1994). 
 32. See id. 
 33. See Markman, 517 U.S. at 373. 
 34. See id. at 373-74.  This is known as the doctrine of equivalents. 
 35. Id. at 374. 
 36. See id. 
 37. See id. at 377. 
 38. Graco Children’s Prods., 77 F. Supp. 2d at 663. 
 39. See Markman, 517 U.S. at 370.  The “Seventh Amendment right of 
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“no exact antecedent”40 in old English common law for modern 
patent claim construction, the Court determined that the best 
eighteenth century analogue was the old practice for the 
construction of patent specifications.41  The limited number of 
patent cases available from that period do not reveal a well-
established jury practice of specification interpretation that 
would allow one to conclude that modern claim construction 
should be a guaranteed jury issue.42  A judge, more than a jury 
that may capriciously construe or refine the patent, 43 is 
qualified with his legal training and experience to properly 
construct extremely technical patents.44  Finally, the Court 
stressed that the consistent and uniform treatment of a 
particular patent was significant enough to independently 
justify claim interpretation as an issue of law.45  The Court also 
noted that to encourage such uniformity, Congress established 
the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals as the sole appellate court 
 
trial by jury is the right which existed under the English common law when 
the Amendment was adopted.”  Id.  The Court reasoned that the answer to the 
question of if the issue were one of law or fact depends “on whether the jury 
must shoulder this responsibility as necessary to preserve the ‘substance of 
the common-law right of trial by jury.’”  Id. at 377 (quoting Colgrove v. Battin, 
413 U.S. 149, 157 (1973) (internal citation omitted)). 
 40. Id. at 378. 
 41. See id. at 379.  The Court compared “the modern practice to earlier 
ones whose allocation to court or jury we do know” of and sought to draw “the 
best analogy . . . between an old and . . . new” practice.  Id. at 378. 
 42. See id. at 379-380.  The Court found a “mere smattering of patent 
cases” available from that period.  Id. 
 43. See id. at 383.  Also, the judge “is in a better position to ascertain 
whether an expert’s proposed definition fully comports with the instrument as 
a whole.”  Id. at 371.  The patent, “like other written instruments, . . . must be 
interpreted as a whole . . . and the legal deductions drawn therefrom must be 
conformable with the scope and purpose of the entire document.”  Brown v. 
Huger, 62 U.S. 305, 318 (1858). 
 44. See id. at 371. 
 45. See Markman, 517 U.S. at 390.  The Court focused on “the importance 
of uniformity in the treatment of a given patent as an independent reason to 
allocate all issues of construction to the court.”  Id.  The Court reasoned that 
the “limits of a patent must be known for the protection of the patentee, the 
encouragement of inventive genius of others and the assurance that the 
subject of the patent will be dedicated ultimately to the public.”  Id. (quoting 
General Elec. Co. v. Wabash Appliance Corp., 304 U.S. 364, 369 (1938)).  The 
Court also noted otherwise a “zone of uncertainty which enterprise and 
experimentation may enter only at the risk of infringement claims would 
discourage invention only a little less than unequivocal foreclosure of the 
field.”  Id. (quoting United Carbon Co. v. Binney & Smith Co., 317 U.S. 228, 
236 (1942)).  Also, the  “public [would] be deprived of rights supposed to belong 
to it, without being clearly told what it is that limits these rights.”  Id. 
(quoting Merrill v. Yeomans, 94 U.S. 568, 573 (1877)). 
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for patent litigation46 and observed that greater uniformity 
would strengthen the patent system by fostering industrial 
innovation and technological growth.47  Therefore, the Court 
concluded that the extensive interpretive skill of judges, policy 
considerations, and existing precedent all supported the 
allocation of modern claim construction to the court.48  Thus, 
the Court held that claim construction is a question of law, 
solely for the court to determine, while the issue of 
infringement remains a question of fact.49 
After the Markman decision, patent claim construction 
became a question of law to be determined by the court.50  
Normally, the parties litigate the claim interpretation issues 
before trial,51 which allows the court, at the outset of the suit, to 
instruct the jury as to the scope of the patent claims.52  A 
court’s decision on the construction of the patent claims is now 
appropriately known as a Markman ruling or order. 
 
C. TM PATENTS, L.P. V. IBM CORP. 
 
In TM Patents, L.P. v. IBM Corp,53 the plaintiffs were 
successors-in-interest to the patent estate of Thinking 
Machines Corporation (TM), “a developer and manufacturer of 
computers and peripheral computer equipment.”54  The 
plaintiffs brought suit against defendant IBM, alleging 
infringement of three of TM’s patents by IBM products.55  Two 
of the patents related to computer data storage technologies 
and data error detection and correction.56  The third patent 
dealt with a communications routing strategy in parallel 
 
 46. See id. 
 47. See id.  (referring to H.R. Rep. No. 97-312, at 20 (1981)). 
 48. See id. at 371. 
 49. See id. at 370-71.  The Court held that the “construction of a patent, 
including terms of art within its claim,” is a question of law, “exclusively 
within the province of the court.”  Id at 370.  However, the issue of  “whether 
infringement occurred, is a question of fact for a jury.”  Id. at 371. 
 50. See TM Patents, 72 F. Supp. 2d at 376. 
 51. See id. 
 52. See id. 
 53. 72 F. Supp. 2d 370 (S.D.N.Y 1999). 
 54. Id. at 374 
 55. See id. 
 56. See id.  (United States Patent No. 4,899,342 (the ‘342 patent) and 
United States Patent No. 5,202,979 (the ‘979 patent)). 
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processors.57 
The district court recognized that the action against IBM 
was not the first infringement action pertaining to the patents-
in-suit to reach the point of a Markman hearing.58  Previously, 
TM had sued EMC Corporation, a competitor of IBM, in the 
District Court for the District of Massachusetts, a case heard 
by Chief Judge William G. Young.59  In a Markman hearing, 
Chief Judge Young construed some, but not all, of the disputed 
claims.60  After a two day hearing, Judge Young issued his 
ruling.61 
IBM asserted in the case against TM that TM was 
collaterally estopped from relitigating the previous claim 
interpretation.62  TM, on the other hand, argued that the 
previous Markman ruling, although substantially correct, 
should not “be accorded former adjudication effect.”63  TM 
reasoned that this was the correct result because a settlement 
was reached during trial in the prior case, rendering that 
Markman ruling not “sufficiently final” to be accorded 
preclusive effect.64 
The court in TM Patents concluded that IBM was correct, 
while also recognizing that the case raised an issue of first 
impression.65  The court held that Judge Young’s Markman 
ruling, which occurred after the patentee “had a full and fair 
opportunity to litigate the meaning” of the disputed terms, was 
binding during the subsequent litigation.66  In reaching the 
conclusion that Markman rulings have preclusive effect, the 
TM Patents court focused on the fourth and final element of 
collateral estoppel: that the determination of the issues must 
 
 57. See id.  (United States Patent No. 5,212,773 (the ‘773 patent)). 
 58. See id. at 375. 
 59. See id.  (referring to TM Patents v. EMC Corp., Civil Action No. 98-
10206 (D. Mass. Jan. 27, 1999)). 
 60. See id. 
 61. See id. 
 62. See id.  IBM argued that TM was “either collaterally or judicially 
estopped to relitigate the claims that Judge Young construed – with which 
constructions IBM (a non-party to the EMC action) is in substantial (though 
not total) agreement.”  Id. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. 
 65. See id. 
 66. Id.  “Judge Young’s resolution of the meaning of certain disputed 
patent terms following a Markman hearing, at which TM had a full and fair 
opportunity to litigate the meaning of those terms, is binding on the Plaintiffs 
in this action.”  Id. 
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have been essential to support a final and valid judgment.67  
TM argued that the dispute with EMC regarding the claim 
interpretation was never elevated to final judgment status 
because the action resulted in a settlement before a jury 
returned a verdict on the issue of infringement.68  TM asserted 
that there was no finality for former adjudication purposes 
because a final, appealable judgment did not exist.69  However, 
the court definitively denied that as being the law in any 
circuit.70  The court cited Lummus Co. v. Commonwealth Oil 
Refining Co.71 for the proposition that, although a judgment is 
not final as defined by 28 U.S.C. § 1291, it can still be 
considered final in the sense that the issues actually litigated 
should be granted preclusive effect.72  As the court noted, the 
question of whether a court will consider a ruling final depends 
on numerous factors, including the opportunity for review.73  
The court also concurred with the view expressed by the 
Lummus court that the entire decision may simply boil down to 
whether the litigation of a particular matter has reached such a 
point that there remains no compelling reason to litigate it any 
further.74 
The court pointed to the Georgakis v. Eastern Air Lines, 
Inc.75 decision as an illustration of the Lummus principle.76  
That case involved a plaintiff who sued the defendant airline 
for injuries resulting from an airplane crash.77  The plaintiff 
sought summary judgment against the airline’s affirmative 
 
 67. See id. 
 68. See id. 
 69. See id. 
 70. See id.  The court strongly asserted “that is not the law in this Circuit 
(or any other, for that matter).”  Id. 
 71. 297 F.2d 80, 89 (2d Cir. 1961). 
 72. See TM Patents, 72 F. Supp. 2d at 375-76 (“[I]t has been settled that a 
judgment that is not ‘final’ in the sense of 28 U.S.C. § 1291 can nonetheless be 
considered ‘final’ in the sense of precluding further litigation of issues that 
were actually determined in such a judgment.”).  Appellate courts have 
“jurisdiction of appeals from all final decisions of the district courts.”  28 
U.S.C. § 1291 (1994). 
 73. See id. at 376.  “Whether a ruling is sufficiently final turns on ‘such 
factors as the nature of the decision (i.e., that it was not avowedly tentative), 
the adequacy of the hearing, and the opportunity for review.’”  Id.  (quoting 
Lummus, 297 F.2d at 89). 
 74. See id. 
 75. 512 F. Supp. 330 (E.D.N.Y. 1981). 
 76. See TM Patents, 72 F. Supp. 2d at 376. 
 77. See Georgakis, 512 F. Supp. at 330. 
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defense that plaintiff’s damages were limited to $75,000 by the 
Warsaw Convention.78  However, in prior litigation arising from 
the same crash, but involving a different passenger, this same 
court granted summary judgment against the airline on the 
same affirmative defense.79  In the subsequent Georgakis suit, 
the plaintiff invoked collateral estoppel against the airline.80  
The airline argued that the interlocutory nature of the previous 
decision precluded application of collateral estoppel.81  
However, the Georgakis court took an expansive view of 
collateral estoppel.  It stated “collateral estoppel does not 
require a judgment ‘which ends the litigation . . . and leaves 
nothing for the court to do but execute the judgment,’ . . . but 
includes many dispositions which, though not final in that 
sense, have nevertheless been fully litigated.”82 
The TM Patents court noted that, after the Markman 
decision, claim construction became a question of law for the 
court to determine.83  Frequently, the Markman hearing occurs 
before the trial so at the outset of the case the court can 
instruct the jury on the scope of the patent.84  During the 
Markman hearing, the court will limit itself to construing only 
portions of the claims that are vital to the determination of the 
issues of validity and infringement.85  Afterward, the jury must 
adhere to the court’s interpretations of any disputed terms.86  
Thus, the TM Patents court reasoned that it is “hard to see” 
how a determination can be much more final than a Markman 
ruling.87 
The court found that TM and EMC were “ably represented” 
during the previous litigation concerning the Markman 
hearing.88  The litigants identified the claim limitations in 
dispute.89  The court heard sufficient evidence to properly 
 
 78. See id. at 330-31. 
 79. See id. at 331-33. 
 80. See id. at 333. 
 81. See id.at 334. 
 82. Id. (quoting Zdanok v. Glidden Co., Durkee Famous Foods Div., 327 
F.2d 944, 955 (2d Cir. 1964) (internal citations omitted)). 
 83. See TM Patents, 72 F. Supp. 2d at 376. 
 84. See id. 
 85. See id. 
 86. See id. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. 
 89. See id.  (“The parties identified certain claim limitations on whose 
meaning they could not agree, and Judge Young heard whatever evidence he 
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construe the disputed limitations and issue a detailed ruling,90 
after which the court permitted reargument and made several 
modifications to the claim construction.91  Then, at the 
beginning of the trial in a preliminary jury instruction, Judge 
Young read his claim interpretation to the jury.92  Judge Young 
also used his construction to guide evidentiary rulings.93  
Additionally, copies of the claim construction were available to 
the jurors during the course of the trial.94  The TM Patents 
court concluded that a verdict would not have altered the 
previous Markman rulings of Judge Young.95  The court 
reasoned that nothing remained between the parties to 
adjudicate on the question of claim interpretation, as the actual 
application of the properly construed claim to the accused 
device was immaterial to the finality of Judge Young’s prior 
Markman ruling.96  The TM Patents court stated that under 
Lummus, the timing of the ruling was of no consequence.97  
Therefore, under existing precedent, the court considers 
Markman rulings sufficiently final such that they are to be 
accorded preclusive effect.98 
To support its holding, the TM Patents court noted that one 
of the Supreme Court’s rationales for upholding the Markman 
decision was to promote uniform claim construction.99  The 
 
thought necessary to interpret those limitations.”). 
 90. See id. 
 91. See id. 
 92. See id. 
 93. See id. at 376-77. 
 94. See id. at 377. 
 95. See id. 
 96. See id. (“Nothing more remained to be adjudicated; nothing more 
remained to be decided on the issue of claim construction.  The application of 
the claim to the product was immaterial to the finality of Judge Young’s 
determinations.”). 
 97. See id. at 378. 
 98. See id. at 377.  The court stated, “under Lummus and its progeny, the 
results of the Markman hearing in the EMC action were sufficiently ‘final’ to 
permit application of collateral estoppel – even though the matter to which 
they were necessary was never reduced to a final judgment after verdict.”  Id.  
The court also cited RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 13, cmt. 
e (1980) (“A judgment may be final in a res judicata sense as to part of an 
action although the litigation continues as to the rest.”); Sherman v. Jacobson, 
247 F. Supp. 261, 268 (S.D.N.Y. 1965) (noting that a judgment “may be final 
as to some matters, even though the litigation continues as to others”). 
Id. (italics omitted). 
 99. See id. (“[O]ne of the Supreme Court’s rationales for upholding the 
Federal Circuit’s ground-breaking decision in Markman was the promotion of 
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court additionally recognized that prior to Markman, in Pfaff v. 
Wells Electronics, Inc.,100 the “Federal Circuit had held that 
determination of the scope of a patent claim in a prior 
infringement action could have collateral estoppel effect 
against the patentee in a subsequent case.”101  The TM Patents 
court felt that the Markman decision had swung the pendulum 
even farther.  Therefore, the court concluded that, after 
Markman, it was inconceivable that a fully litigated Markman 
ruling would not be accorded collateral estoppel in subsequent 
suits involving the same disputed claims102 given that the 
ultimate goal of a Markman proceeding is finality.103 
 
D. GRACO CHILDREN’S PRODUCTS V. REGALO INT’L LLC 
 
In Graco Children’s Products v. Regalo Int’l LLC,104 the 
plaintiffs claimed infringement of their patent on an invention 
for an easily transportable child’s playpen.105  In a previous 
suit, Graco claimed Century Products Company infringed the 
same patent by making and selling the Fold ‘N Go.106  In that 
suit, the trial judge held a hearing and issued a ruling 
pursuant to Markman.107  In the ensuing jury trial, the jury 
found infringement by the accused device under the doctrine of 
equivalents.108  Century appealed to the Federal Circuit Court 
of Appeals,109 and Graco filed a cross-appeal to the Federal 
 
uniformity in the meaning to be given to a patent claim.” (citing Markman,  
517 U.S. at 390-91)). 
 100. 5 F.3d 514 (Fed. Cir. 1993). 
 101. TM Patents, 72 F. Supp. 2d at 377 (citing Pfaff, 5 F.3d at 517-18). 
 102. See id.  “[I]t is inconceivable that a fully-litigated determination after 
a first Markman hearing would not be preclusive in subsequent actions 
involving the same disputed claims under the same patent.” (emphasis added).  
Id. 
 103. See id. 
 104. 77 F. Supp. 2d 660 (E.D. Pa. 1999). 
 105. See id. at 661 (the patent-in-suit was United States Patent No. 
4,811,437). 
 106. See id. 
 107. See id. 
 108. See id.  The “jury also found that the Fold ‘N Go did not literally 
infringe the ‘437 patent, that the infringement under the doctrine of 
equivalents was not willful, and [sic] that the ‘437 patent is not invalid for 
obviousness or lack of specificity.”  Id. at 661-62.  Also, the “court held that the 
‘437 patent was not unenforceable due to inequitable conduct.”  Id. at 662. 
 109. See id. at 662. 
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Circuit.110  However, both the appeal and the cross-appeal were 
dismissed when the parties reached a settlement.111 
In the subsequent Graco litigation, Regalo requested that 
the court grant preclusive effect to the prior claim construction 
of the patent-in-suit that resulted from the previous litigation 
involving Graco.112  On November 29, 1999, the court concluded 
that Graco was not bound by the previous claim 
interpretation.113  In doing so, the court reasoned that the 
previous parties lacked an adequate incentive to fully litigate 
the claim construction because a settlement was reached before 
the possibility of appellate review.114  Shortly thereafter, 
counsel for Graco advised the court of the recent TM Patents 
decision issued by the United States District Court for the 
Southern District of New York, which held that a Markman 
ruling possessed preclusive effect despite a subsequent 
settlement.115  Accordingly, Regalo requested that the court 
reconsider its order in light of the TM Patents decision.116 
The court in Graco recognized that whether a patentee who 
is the beneficiary of a favorable verdict in an infringement 
action should be bound to that court’s claim construction was 
an issue of first impression.117  The court began by analyzing 
Jackson Jordan, Inc. v. Plasser American Corp.,118 in which the 
district court erred in granting preclusive effect to a decision 
from a previous infringement case.119  The Federal Circuit 
recognized that if a district court construed the claims 
 
 110. See id. 
 111. See id. 
 112. See id.  Regalo requested that the court “find Graco to be bound by 
issue preclusion to the prior claim interpretation from Graco I of the term 
‘unitary central hub member’ found in claim 1 of the ‘437 patent.”  Id. 
 113. See id. 
 114. See id. 
 115. See id. 
 116. See id. 
 117. See id.  The court requested that the parties provide “supplemental 
briefing on the applicability of the first exception to the general rule of issue 
preclusion, found in § 28 of the Restatement (Second) of Judgments, to the 
case at hand.  In addition, the parties were asked to examine Jackson Jordan, 
Inc. v. Plasser American Corporation . . . and its effect on the instant action.”  
Id. at n.3.  The court realized that it was ruling on “an issue of first impression 
regarding whether a party who receives a favorable verdict in a patent 
infringement suit should be bound by the trial court’s interpretation of a term 
within the claim of the patent at issue that becomes the subject of a 
subsequent litigation.”  Id. 
 118. 747 F.2d 1567 (Fed. Cir. 1984). 
 119. See Graco Children’s Prods., 77 F. Supp. 2d at 663. 
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narrower than the patentee urged, that party could be said to 
have effectively lost on that issue.120  However, in its 
application of the Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 28(1), 
the Federal Circuit noted that when a claim is ruled valid and 
infringed on the basis of a narrow claim interpretation, the 
patentee cannot appeal that construction.121  Hence, in Jackson 
Jordan there was no opportunity for review of the claim 
construction because the patentee won on both the question of 
validity and infringement.122  Hence, issue preclusion was not 
applicable.123 
The parties in Graco agreed that Jackson Jordan stands 
for the proposition that the first exception to the Restatement 
(Second) of Judgments § 28 is appropriate where a patentee 
won an infringement action but remains convinced that the 
claim interpretation was construed too narrowly.124  And, 
having won, the patentee has no incentive to appeal.125  
However, the parties disputed whether, after Markman, 
Jackson Jordan was still good law and specifically identified 
the TM Patents decision as the only court that had previously 
addressed the topic.126 
The court in Graco noted that the TM Patents court had 
reviewed the pre-Markman Federal Circuit decisions cited by 
TM and concluded that the analysis of those suits was rendered 
irrelevant in light of the goal of Markman hearings.127  The 
Graco court realized the significance of uniform and consistent 
treatment of a particular patent.128  However, it also strongly 
argued that Markman did not stand for the proposition that the 
application of issue preclusion would be guaranteed in every 
instance, as the circumstances of a specific case may dictate a 
 
 120. See Jackson Jordan, Inc., 747 F.2d at 1577. 
 121. See id. at 1578. 
 122. See id.  The court concluded that “under the first exception to issue 
preclusion noted in Restatement § 28(1) (availability of review), Canron could 
not invoke an estoppel against Plasser since Plasser won on both validity and 
infringement.”  Id. 
 123. See id. 
 124. See Graco Children’s Prods., 77 F. Supp. 2d at 663. 
 125. See id. 
 126. See id. 
 127. See id. 
 128. See id.  There is “no question that, by instructing courts to decide 
issues of claim construction in patent cases, the Court in Markman recognized 
the importance of uniformity in the treatment of a given patent.”  Id. 
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different result.129  Additionally, the court cited Cybor Corp. v. 
Fas Technologies, Inc. 130 for the proposition that Markman 
solely addressed the respective trial roles of judge and jury.131  
The court also pointed out that the Restatement (Second) of 
Judgments § 28 specifically provides: 
Although an issue is actually litigated and determined by a valid 
and final judgment, and the determination is essential to the 
judgment, relitigation of the issue in a subsequent action between 
the parties is not precluded in the following circumstances: 
(1) The party against whom preclusion is sought could not, as a 
matter of law have obtained review of the judgment in the 
initial action[.]132 
With respect to Graco’s opportunity or incentive to appeal 
the initial claim construction, Regalo pointed to the fact that 
“Century did file an appeal prior to the settlement 
agreement.”133  This created an opportunity that would have 
allowed Graco to file a cross-appeal on the issue of claim 
construction.  However, they chose not to.134  “The subsequent 
appeal was dismissed after a settlement was reached.”135  Still, 
the court disagreed with Regalo and concluded that collateral 
estoppel was not applicable to the claim construction issue that 
Graco lost because that issue could not be appealed by itself as 
Graco won on its infringement claim.136  The court relied on 
Hartley v. Mentor Corp.137 for the proposition that, where a 
“party wins on claim, but loses on issue, no issue preclusion 
attaches to [the] lost issue which could not by itself be 
appealed.”138  Moreover, the court cited In re Freeman139 to 
argue that former adjudication effect should only be granted to 
 
 129. See id.  The Markman decision “did not guarantee that collateral 
estoppel would apply in every case, and this Court will not extend the 
Supreme Court ruling to mean as much, especially where, as here, the 
circumstances of the instant action require that a different result be reached.”  
Id. 
 130. 138 F.3d 1448 (Fed. Cir. 1998). 
 131. See Graco Children’s Prods., 77 F. Supp. 2d at 663. 
 132. Id. at 663-64 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 
28(1) (1980)). 
 133. Id. at 664. 
 134. See id. 
 135. Id. 
 136. See id. 
 137. 869 F.2d 1469, 1472 (Fed. Cir. 1989). 
 138. Graco Children’s Prods., 77 F. Supp. 2d at 664. 
 139. 30 F.3d 1459 (Fed. Cir. 1994). 
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prior claim constructions if the interpretation was the reason 
for losing on the question of infringement in the previous 
action.140  The court stated, “Graco did not lose the previous 
litigation, but, instead, obtained a jury verdict in its favor 
based on the doctrine of equivalents, making the court’s 
interpretation of the term within the patent claim not essential 
to the final judgment.”141  For further support of that 
proposition, the court cited A.B. Dick Co. v. Burroughs Corp,142 
finding that the court would give preclusive effect to judicial 
statements pertaining to the scope of the claims only if the 
resolution of the scope was essential to a final judgment.143 
Furthermore, Graco’s argument convinced the court that 
granting collateral estoppel effect to claim constructions would 
discourage settlements and encourage appeals.144  This would 
result because a plaintiff who obtained a favorable outcome 
would remain compelled to appeal an unacceptable, narrow 
claim interpretation rather than be content with a winning 
verdict or a profitable settlement.145  The court dismissed the 
defendant’s contention that those concerns give way to the 
larger policy considerations behind the Markman decision.  
Primarily, the public is entitled to know the scope of a patent 
claim, and secondly, the relitigation of previously decided 
issues results in an unnecessary burden on the judicial 
system.146  The court reasoned that such countervailing 
considerations were absent in the case at hand.  The prior 
action involved only the interpretation of a single term in a 
single claim and the previous litigants did not dispute the 
broader meaning of any claim in its entirety.147  Furthermore, 
the court cited In re Freeman for the proposition that a court 
 
 140. See id. at 1466.  The court stated, “to apply issue preclusion to a claim 
interpretation issue decided in a prior infringement adjudication, ‘the 
interpretation of the claim had to be the reason for the loss [in the prior case] 
on the issue of infringement.’”  Id.  (quoting Jackson Jordan, Inc. v. Plasser 
Amer. Corp., 747 F.2d 1567, 1577). 
 141. Graco Children’s Prods., 77 F. Supp. 2d at 664. 
 142. 713 F.2d 700 (Fed. Cir. 1983). 
 143. See id. at 704.  The court stated that “[j]udicial statements regarding 
the scope of patent claims are entitled to collateral estoppel effect in a 
subsequent infringement suit only to the extent that determination of scope 
was essential to a final judgment on the question of validity or infringement.”  
Id. 
 144. See Graco Children’s Prods., 77 F. Supp. 2d at 664. 
 145. See id. 
 146. See id. 
 147. See id. 
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has some discretion to decide whether a particular case is 
appropriate for the application of issue preclusion because the 
doctrine is premised on the principle of fairness.148  
Consequently, the court held that regardless of the importance 
of uniform claim construction, the given circumstances of the 
case at hand prevented preclusive effect from being applied to 
the Markman ruling of the previous court.149 
 
II. AN APPROPRIATE PROCEDURAL SOLUTION TO 
RESOLVE THE SPLIT OF AUTHORITY 
 
Because of the drastically different holdings of TM Patents 
and Graco, the lower federal courts have split on the issue of 
the preclusive effect of prior claim constructions.  While more 
courts have begun to cite the two cases,150 there are two recent 
cases from other districts squarely on point.  The United States 
District Court for the Western District of Kentucky 
wholeheartedly supported the TM Patents decision in Louisville 
Bedding Co. v. Perfect Fit Industries.151  However, the United 
States District Court for the Western District of Virginia firmly 
asserted that Graco embodied the correct analysis and result in 
Kollmorgen Corp. v. Yaskawa Electric Corp.152  In these more 
recent cases, the patent holders had settled previous litigation 
after a Markman ruling was issued.153  The Louisville Bedding 
court gave preclusive effect to the prior ruling,154 while the 
 
 148. See id. 
 149. See Graco Children’s Prods., 77 F. Supp. 2d at 665.  The court stated 
that despite the “importance of uniformity in the treatment of a given patent, 
circumstances may exist where, as here, despite a previous court having held 
a hearing on the claim construction of a patent pursuant to Markman, 
collateral estoppel will not apply to such decisions.”  Id. 
 150. See eg. Edberg v. CPI-The Alternative Supplier, Inc., 156 F. Supp 2d 
190 (D. Conn. June 4, 2001); Allen-Bradley Co. v. Kollmorgan Corp., 199 
F.R.D. 316 (E.D. Wis. 2001); Abbott Labs. v. Dey, L.P., 110 F. Supp. 2d 667 
(N.D. Ill 2000). 
 151. 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9599 (W.D. Ky. June 25, 2001).  That court 
stated that “[i]t is not for this court to judge the correctness of a previous 
judge’s claim interpretation in determining its preclusive effect.”  Id. at *7. 
 152. 147 F. Supp. 2d 464 (W.D. Va. 2001). 
 153. See Louisville Bedding Co., 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9599.  See also 
Kollmorgen Corp. v. Yaskawa Elec. Corp., 147 F. Supp. 2d 464, 470 (W.D. Va. 
2001). 
 154. See Louisville Bedding Co., 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9599 at *14 
(stating that the “application of collateral estoppel is an issue to be determined 
on a case-by-case basis.  This court has applied the law regarding issue 
preclusion to the circumstances of this case and finds it appropriate.”). 
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Kollmorgen court did not.155 
 
A.  THE POLICY BEHIND MARKMAN AND PATENT CLAIM  
CONSISTENCY 
 
One of the central issues in dispute in this debate is 
whether a Markman ruling is “essential” to the final judgment 
when the alleged “final judgment” is actually a consensual 
settlement between the litigants.  The policy behind the 
Markman decision supports the proposition that a Markman 
ruling followed by a settlement should not be accorded 
preclusive effect where an actual final judgment is not 
reached.156  TM Patents correctly noted that the uniform 
treatment of specific patent claims was one of the foundations 
of the Court’s reasoning in Markman.157  Indeed, there is no 
question that a desire to provide the public with consistent 
claim interpretations significantly factored into the Court’s 
decision.158  Those who promote the application of collateral 
estoppel to Markman rulings support the notion that the 
preclusion will advance the goal of uniform and consistent 
patent claim constructions.  Yet, it is “extremely ironic”159 that 
in the cases mentioned above, the plaintiff patent holder had no 
realistic opportunity, nor incentive, to have the Markman 
ruling reviewed.  After a settlement, the Federal Circuit is 
deprived of jurisdiction over the matter and lacks the power to 
review the Markman ruling, unless an interlocutory appeal is 
certified.160  However, even if a district court judge certifies an 
interlocutory appeal, the Federal Circuit consistently declines 
review of claim interpretations.161  Despite the Federal Circuit’s 
strong inclination to refuse to entertain interlocutory appeals, 
when the Federal Circuit does review a district court claim 
construction, almost forty percent of the rulings are either 
 
 155. See Kollmorgen Corp., 147 F. Supp. 2d at 470.  The court concluded 
that “[c]ourts need not blindly apply the doctrine of collateral estoppel to a 
prior Markman ruling that construes a patent’s scope and claim.”  Id. 
 156. See id. at 467. 
 157. See TM Patents, L.P. v. IBM Corp., 72 F. Supp. 2d 370, 377 (S.D.N.Y. 
1999). 
 158. See Kollmorgen Corp., 147 F. Supp. 2d at 467. 
 159. Id. 
 160. See id. 
 161. See id. 
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changed or overturned.162  Given the fact that nearly half of the 
claim constructions reviewed by the Federal Circuit are either 
changed or overturned, it is extremely difficult to explain why 
the Federal Circuit generally declines to entertain interlocutory 
appeals pertaining to patent claim construction. 
The TM Patents proposition, that it is inconceivable not to 
accord preclusive effect to a fully-litigated prior Markman 
ruling,163 “contradicts logic.”164  It is obvious that the desired 
need for uniformity of patent claims and scope provided the 
basis for the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Markman.165  
However, the Court’s analysis presumes that a district court’s 
claim interpretation is accurate.166  It is highly unlikely that the 
Court’s keen interest in consistency and uniformity outweighs 
the greater interest in obtaining proper claim interpretation.167  
Furthermore, the Supreme Court took an extreme interest in 
patent uniformity in noting that the Federal Circuit Court of 
Appeals was created to be the exclusive avenue for review of 
patent suits.168  Clearly, with the Federal Circuit acting as the 
ultimate interpreter on the issue of claim construction, the 
desired uniformity was more realistically obtainable.169  
Additionally, although the TM Patents court correctly stated 
that the Federal Circuit, even before Markman, had held that 
collateral estoppel could apply to claim constructions of 
previous infringement actions,170 it neglected to recognize that 
the determinative word is “could,” not “should” or “will,” have 
collateral estoppel effect.  Furthermore, while Markman 
strongly and unquestionably supports the promotion of 
uniformity in patent claim interpretation, it should not be 
viewed to stand for the proposition that patent interpretations 
will be blindly adopted as complete and accurate without the 
opportunity to undergo the rigorous review of the Federal 
 
 162. See TM Patents, 72 F. Supp. 2d at 378. 
 163. See supra note 102 and accompanying text. 
 164. Kollmorgen Corp. v. Yaskawa Elec. Corp., 147 F. Supp. 2d 464, 468 
(W.D. Va. 2001). 
 165. See supra note 99 and accompanying text. 
 166. See Kollmorgen Corp., 147 F. Supp. 2d at 468. 
 167. See id.  The court stated that “[s]urely no judicial scholar would argue 
the Supreme Court’s interests in uniformity is mutually exclusive to an 
interest in a proper patent claim construction.”  Id. 
 168. See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 390 
(1996). 
 169. See Kollmorgen Corp., 147 F. Supp 2d at 468. 
 170. See supra text accompanying note 101. 
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Circuit.171  This is the only sensible approach in light of the 
disturbing fact that nearly half of all the patent claim 
constructions the Federal Circuit reviews are either revised or 
overturned.172 
 
B. MARKMAN RULING NOT ESSENTIAL TO A FINAL JUDGMENT  
 OF PATENT INFRINGEMENT 
 
The Markman ruling must be essential to final judgment 
for collateral estoppel to be applicable.173  In TM Patents, the 
court held that the claim constructions of the prior case were 
sufficiently “final” to be granted preclusive effect even though 
they were not reduced to a final judgment by way of a jury 
verdict.174  The court admitted that it is not insignificant that 
the Federal Circuit never reviewed the previous claim 
constructions.175  However, that court also concluded that the 
fact that the case settled was the sole reason that the Markman 
ruling was not reviewed on appeal.176  It continued to 
definitively state that a “party who cuts off his right to review 
by settling a disputed matter cannot complain that the 
question was never reviewed on appeal.”177  Finally, that court 
held that the Markman rulings possessed preclusive effect for 
two reasons.178  First, the settlement did not vacate the 
rulings.179  Second, a Markman ruling possessed a unique 
finality.180 
Admittedly, the Markman decision ushered in a new 
standard for patent claim interpretation.181  However, it did not 
obliterate the fact that all of the appeals originating from 
patent litigation are heard by the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Federal Circuit.182  The court in TM Patents 
 
 171. See Kollmorgen Corp., 147 F. Supp. 2d at 468. 
 172. See supra text accompanying note 162. 
 173. See supra text accompanying note 15. 
 174. See supra text accompanying note 1. 
 175. TM Patents, L.P. v. IBM Corp., 72 F. Supp. 2d 370, 378 (S.D.N.Y. 
1999). 
 176. See id. 
 177. Id. 
 178. See id. 
 179. See id. 
 180. See id. at n.2. 
 181. See TM Patents, L.P. v. IBM Corp., 72 F. Supp. 2d 370, 376 (S.D.N.Y. 
1999). 
 182. See supra text accompanying note 46. 
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misinterpreted the Markman decision as nullifying Federal 
Circuit precedent regarding issue preclusion.183  Although 
Markman clearly specified that patent claim interpretation is a 
question of law to be determined by a judge, and not a question 
of fact to be determined by a jury, “it did not single-handedly 
redefine ‘finality’ for collateral estoppel purposes.”184  The rule 
set forth in Jackson Jordan, that before preclusive effect would 
be given to a prior claim construction, claim interpretation “had 
to be the reason for the loss [in the prior case] on the issue of 
infringement,”185 remains good law and should be followed.  A 
settlement cannot be blindly classified as a “loss.”  At the very 
least, an extensive balancing test of the items gained versus 
conceded would have to be performed.  Also, in at least one 
sense, both sides actually win from a settlement as the time 
and expense of further litigation are no longer expended. 
The TM Patents court argued that a party who agrees to a 
settlement cannot complain that the opportunity for appellate 
review is lost.186  This concept does not withstand scrutiny.  
There are numerous reasons why parties have an incentive to 
negotiate and reach a settlement, many of which have nothing 
to do with the validity or the strength of an opponent’s cause of 
action.  For example, the goal of a settlement may simply be to 
avoid the time and expense intertwined with further litigation.  
Other reasons include prevention of a negative public image 
and the accompanying economic ramifications of such an 
image, and the desire to create or maintain a mutually 
beneficial business relationship with the opponent.  Numerous 
other practical economic goals of a settlement also exist.  Yet, 
the TM Patents court failed to consider the possibility of their 
existence.  Because of the above pragmatic analysis, a 
“consensual settlement”187 should not be considered a final 
judgment because a settlement cannot be classified as a “loss” 
of previous litigation.  Therefore, the doctrine of collateral 
estoppel is inappropriate.188 
 
 183. See Kollmorgen Corp. v. Yaskawa Elec. Corp., 147 F. Supp. 2d 464, 
467 (W.D. Va. 2001). 
 184. Id. 
 185. In re Freeman, 30 F.3d 1459, 1466 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (quoting Jackson 
Jordan, Inc. v. Plasser Amer. Corp., 747 F.2d 1567, 1577); see also supra text 
accompanying note 140. 
 186. See TM Patents, 72 F. Supp. 2d at 378. 
 187. Kollmorgen Corp., 147 F. Supp. 2d at 467. 
 188. See id. 
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C.  THE NEGATIVE EFFECT PRECLUSION WOULD CAST OVER  
 POSSIBLE FUTURE SETTLEMENTS 
 
The application of the doctrine of collateral estoppel to an 
unappealable order would certainly have a negative and 
dramatic effect on settlements.189  The reasoning of TM Patents 
was that since a settlement precludes review, a party to that 
settlement should not be allowed to argue that the issue never 
appealed.190  However, as the court in Graco noted, appeals 
would be encouraged and settlements discouraged by the blind 
application of collateral estoppel to Markman rulings.191  The 
court correctly reasoned that despite the existence of a 
favorable verdict, a patentee would remain compelled to appeal 
the narrow claim interpretation rather than be satisfied with 
the result of the lawsuit.192  It is unquestionably unfair to deny 
a party an opportunity to appeal a potentially preclusive 
Markman ruling.  The court in TM Patents disregarded the fact 
that the Federal Circuit consistently refuses to entertain the 
review of claim interpretations on interlocutory appeal.193  The 
Federal Circuit revises or overturns more than forty percent of 
all Markman rulings.  It follows, then, that nearly half of the 
district courts err while constructing patent claims.  Logically, 
before claim constructions can be accorded preclusive effect, the 
Federal Circuit should grant the litigants the opportunity to 
seek its review and the litigants should be given the 
opportunity to seek the review of the Federal Circuit194 to 
correct erroneous rulings and promote justice.  The application 
of collateral estoppel will significantly hinder, if not completely 
eliminate, settlements during patent litigation195 as the party 
on the receiving end of a damaging Markman ruling has little 
incentive to settle, if it knows that the district court’s patent 
 
 189. See id. at 468. 
 190. See supra text accompanying note 177. 
 191. See Graco Children’s Prods., 77 F. Supp. 2d at 664. 
 192. See id.  The court concluded that “[u]nder such circumstances, a 
plaintiff who obtains a favorable verdict would still be compelled to file an 
appeal rather than be content with winning the lawsuit or settling the case in 
order to correct what they perceive as unduly narrow claim construction.”  Id. 
 193. See supra text accompanying note 162.  The TM Patents decision 
seems to “ignore the reality that the Federal Circuit consistently refuses to 
review lower court’s patent claim constructions on interlocutory appeal.” 
Graco Children’s Prods., 147 F. Supp. 2d at 468. 
 194. See id. 
 195. See id. 
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claim construction will become “final” and hence unappealable.  
Thus, there is little incentive for parties to settle if Markman 
rulings are granted preclusive effect in future litigation as the 
rulings would become virtually unreviewable as a result of a 
settlement before a truly final judgment.196 
 
D. THE APPROPRIATE WEIGHT TO BE AFFORDED PRECEDENCE  
 REGARDING CLAIM CONSTRUCTION AND COLLATERAL  
ESTOPPEL 
 
The TM Patents decision seemed to ignore any precedence 
before Markman pertaining to collateral estoppel as it 
considered the decisions inapplicable after taking into account 
the rationale of Markman rulings.197  Yet, the Kollmorgen court 
reached the opposite conclusion and afforded pre-Markman 
decisions precedential weight as their analysis of patent 
disputes were quite relevant.198  In both TM Patents and Graco, 
the central question was whether, under the doctrine of 
collateral estoppel, the determination of the issue in the 
previous litigation was essential to a final judgment.199  In Pfaff 
v. Wells Electronics, the Federal Circuit held that where a 
previous case determined the scope of the patent’s claims and 
that decision was essential to resolving the question of 
infringement, there is preclusive effect200 for the claim 
interpretations in subsequent litigation.  Additionally, in A.B. 
Dick Co. v. Burroughs Corp., the Federal Circuit stated that 
judicial comments concerning the breadth of the patent claims 
are accorded former adjudication effect only if the resolution of 
the scope was necessary to obtain a final judgment with respect 
to either infringement or validity.201  Thus, the application of 
collateral estoppel is only appropriate if the Markman ruling 
was essential to a final judgment.202  Also, in Comair Rotron, 
Inc. v. Nippon Densan Corp.,203 the Federal Circuit stated that a 
court may examine the particular circumstances of a given case 
 
 196. See id. 
 197. See Graco Children’s Prods., 77 F. Supp. 2d at 663. 
 198. See Kollmorgen Corp. v. Yaskawa Elec. Corp., 147 F. Supp. 2d 464, 
468 (W.D. Va. 2001). 
 199. See A.B. Dick Co., 713 F.2d at 702. 
 200. See Pfaff, 5 F.3d at 517. 
 201. See supra note 143 and accompanying text. 
 202. See Kollmorgen Corp., 147 F. Supp. 2d at 469. 
 203. 49 F.3d 1535 (Fed. Cir. 1995). 
320 MINNESOTA INTELL. PROP. REVIEW [Vol. 3:297 
 
before concluding whether “justice, expediency, and the public 
interest are served” by the application of collateral estoppel.204  
Therefore, even when all the elements of collateral estoppel are 
present in a given scenario, it is still within the court’s power to 
decline to apply the doctrine.205 
After a settlement, the litigation between the parties ends.  
In patent cases, a settlement means that neither a court nor a 
jury ever determined whether a defendant infringed upon the 
patent holder’s patent.  Thus, it is fair to say that the court 
never reached a final judgment on the issue of infringement or 
validity.206  TM Patents cites Lummus Co. for the proposition 
that whether a decision is considered “final” depends upon such 
factors as the adequacy of the hearing, the availability of 
appellate review, and the nature of the decision.207  However, as 
the court in Kollmorgen succinctly and accurately described the 
situation, the absence of “any realistic opportunity for Federal 
Circuit review greatly outweighs the adequacy of the hearing 
and the nature of the Markman Order.”208  The fact that any 
claim construction remains highly uncertain until the Federal 
Circuit reviews it seriously reduces the incentive to settle.209  
Although Markman desired claim interpretation uniformity 
and consistency,210 the almost absolute inability to have the 
Markman ruling reviewed after settlement should be fatal to 
the application of issue preclusion. 
 
E. POSSIBLE REMEDIES TO THE CURRENT SPLIT OF  
 AUTHORITY 
 
Obviously, there is more than one solution to the current 
dilemma of whether or not to give preclusive effect to Markman 
rulings in suits that conclude with a settlement agreement.  
One could follow the holding of TM Patents and always give 
 
 204. Id. at 1538. 
 205. See Kollmorgen Corp., 147 F. Supp. 2d at 469 (citing Abbott Lab. v. 
Dey, L.P., 110 F. Supp. 2d at 670). 
 206. See A.B. Dick Co. v. Burroughs Corp., 713 F.2d 700, 704 (Fed. Cir. 
1983). 
 207. See Lummus Co. v. Commonwealth Oil Refining Co., 297 F.2d 80, 90 
(2d Cir. 1961). 
 208. Kollmorgen Corp., 147 F. Supp. 2d at 869. 
 209. See Cybor Corp. v. Fas Technologies, Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1476 (Fed. 
Cir. 1998). 
 210. See Kollmorgen Corp., 147 F. Supp. 2d at 469. 
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preclusion effect to Markman rulings in the name of finality 
and judicial economy, even if there is no true “final” judgment 
due to a settlement.  Yet, in cases similar to TM Patents, 
injustice would result despite the court claiming that it had 
reviewed the particular circumstances of the case and found no 
good reasons for relitigation.  However, the court’s review in 
TM Patents was rather cursory, and the rationale for affording 
preclusive effect is, at the very least, unpersuasive. 
One could follow the extreme opposite route.  The Graco 
decision would have us conclude that preclusive effect should 
almost never be granted to Markman rulings followed by a 
settlement agreement.  The reasoning, of course, would be that 
due process outweighs the negative impact on the scarce 
available judicial resources.  Additionally, while such waste 
may seem apparent on the face of the matter, as having 
numerous Markman rulings on the same patent at the district 
court level is inefficient, a more in-depth analysis leads one to 
the inevitable conclusion that following the TM Patents 
approach would result in an even larger drain of judicial 
resources.  The drain on judicial resources would occur as the 
incentives to reach settlement agreements were overcome by 
the realization that an unfavorable, unreviewable Markman 
ruling would be given preclusive effect. 
However, a middle ground would appease both sides in 
their quests for judicial economy and due process, respectively.  
After a Markman ruling is given, it should immediately become 
appealable as-of-right.  This would create the much-needed due 
process for either side in the patent dispute that felt that the 
claim construction was erroneous.  It is particularly true in this 
situation, given the astonishing fact that nearly forty percent of 
all patent claim constructions are either revised or reversed by 
the Federal Circuit after review.211  The immediate appeal 
would allow the Federal Circuit to rule on the claim 
construction such that it would indeed become the final and 
ultimate determination of the claims.  Given the final patent 
claim construction and the significant impact it has on patent 
litigation, each party can make a fresh assessment of the legal 
strengths and weaknesses of their respective positions.  The 
probability of success or failure in the litigation will 
appropriately affect each party’s motivation to settle and the 
concessions gained or given in any possible agreement.  With 
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the claim construction known, each party’s likelihood of success 
during the impeding trial becomes significantly more clear.  
Accused infringers facing broad constructions are more likely to 
settle.  Additionally, patent holders receiving narrow 
constructions are also more inclined to settle or, at the extreme, 
no longer pursue the suit.  In either scenario, the chance of 
further litigation decreases. 
Professor Craig Allen Nard of the University of Illinois has 
noted that the Federal Circuit serves a unique role in the 
promotion of patent certainty and uniformity.212  However, he 
argues the Federal Circuit is trying to have it “both ways”213 by 
refusing to entertain interlocutory appeals solely regarding 
claim construction, while simultaneously employing a de novo 
standard of review for all final judgments.214  Furthermore, the 
acceptance of interlocutory appeals would promote early 
certainty and foster settlement negotiations.215  Professor Nard 
recommended that, with respect to their sister courts’ claim 
constructions, the district courts apply the doctrine of collateral 
estoppel when the circumstances warrant its use.216  The 
application of collateral estoppel would “promote uniformity at 
the district court level, and couple with interlocutory review, 
would [also] promote early certainty.”217  Both of these concepts 
are “modern patent law mantras”218 because of their effect on 
claim construction and ultimately the scope of the patent.219 
To promote early certainty, the Federal Circuit has a 
procedural choice.220  The court can continue to utilize a de novo 
standard of review after final judgment and commence 
entertaining interlocutory appeals or change to significantly 
narrower standard of review.221  However, as Professor Nard 
pointed out, the Federal Circuit could not employ both 
effectively.222  Additionally, Professor Nard concluded that the 
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Federal Circuit is not about to alter the narrow standard of 
review of final judgments, because, after the Cybor decision, de 
novo review is the unquestionable standard the Federal Circuit 
intends to apply.223  Therefore, Professor Nard proposed that 
the Court, pursuant to the Rules Enabling Act, should 
promulgate a new procedure pertaining to Markman rulings.224  
The rule would make Markman decisions appealable either as-
a-matter-of-discretion or as-a-matter-of-right.225 
The first option, to make Markman rulings appealable as-
a-matter-of-discretion, envisioned a rule allowing the Federal 
Circuit to entertain an interlocutory appeal specifically on the 
issue of claim construction.226  The rule would be different from 
the current § 1292(b)227 in that it would only apply to Markman 
rulings.228  However, even Professor Nard admitted that this 
proposition might appear to be a questionable solution to the 
problem.229  Yet, he maintained that the proposal would exert 
pressure on the Federal Circuit to actually entertain the appeal 
because of the specific language of such a rule.230  The proposed 
rule would apply only to claim constructions and its creation 
was in direct response to the unwillingness of the Federal 
Circuit to entertain interlocutory appeals solely dealing with 
Markman rulings.231  Finally, Professor Nard strongly asserted 
that the continuing persistence of the Federal Circuit in 
refusing to grant interlocutory appeals provided reformers with 
firmer ammunition upon which to debate that the court’s 
discretion with respect to this issue should be limited or even 
removed.232 
Professor Nard’s stronger and more justifiable position is 
that Markman rulings should be made appealable as-of-right.233  
This proposal would be an “exception to the final judgment rule 
in patent law,”234 which held that a patent infringement 
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decision is final only after an accounting takes place.235  On its 
face, the as-of-right proposal might appear to be a  “radical” 
solution.236  However, as Professor Nard pointed out, an 
exception to the final judgment rule already exists in § 
1292(c)(2),237 which allows, before the completion of an 
accounting, judgment on the issues of patent validity and 
infringement to be appealed as-of-right.238  The rationale for 
this exception is the avoidance of economic waste, as the 
expenditures associated with accountings was immense and if 
the determination of liability were reversed, the resources 
spent to resolve the issue would be irretrievable.239  Promoting 
the as-a-matter-of-discretion interlocutory appeals, versus 
initially lobbying for as-of-right interlocutory appeals, may 
actually prompt the appropriate rulemaking authorities to 
establish such a novel rule in the first place.240  This result may 
occur because the judges belonging to the various committees, 
which possess the power to enact procedural change, would not 
be limiting or removing the discretion currently enjoyed by 
their colleagues.241  However, eventually the as-of-right 
interlocutory appeals may be required due to the reluctance of 





The controversial TM Patents decision started this ongoing 
discussion as to whether or not collateral estoppel should apply 
to Markman rulings subsequently followed by a settlement 
agreement.  Some federal district courts have followed that 
decision, agreeing that the Court’s finality goal expressed in 
Markman and judicial economy outweigh any possible 
appearance of unfairness to the litigants, as they previously 
have had their day in court to litigate the matter fully and 
fairly.243  However, the court in Graco and others have strongly 
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asserted their disapproval of that reasoning.244  These courts 
believe that giving preclusive effect to prior Markman rulings 
subsequently followed by settlement results in a violation of 
due process.  They pointed out that the litigants in the previous 
suit did not have an opportunity, and in some situations lacked 
an incentive, to appeal the prior Markman ruling.  Over forty 
percent of Markman rulings are revised or reversed on appeal.  
Hence, in theory, the application of collateral estoppel to an 
unappealable Markman ruling would give preclusive effect to 
an erroneous decision in almost half of the cases.  This qualifies 
as a “really good reason” to relitigate the claim construction.245  
Additionally, the preclusive effect to Markman rulings in this 
situation would decrease the number of settlements and 
increase the average length of litigation.  The result would be a 
larger negative impact on judicial resources than the advantage 
gained from the application of collateral estoppel to start with.  
Furthermore, the Court in Markman did not abolish all prior 
precedent on the application of collateral estoppel to claim 
constructions.  A settlement is not a final decision on the 
question of validity or infringement.  Thus, it should not be 
viewed as such for collateral estoppel purposes.246  Opponents of 
the application of collateral estoppel have more well-reasoned 
arguments to support their conclusion.  Therefore, until a 
procedural change occurs, preclusive effect should not be 
afforded. 
The procedural change that would correctly solve the 
problem is to make Markman rulings appealable as-of-right.  
This would satisfy the primary concern of both sides in this 
debate.  The collateral estoppel supporters would receive their 
finality of the Markman ruling before trial and in subsequent 
trials, and thus achieve their much desired elimination of the 
wasteful use of limited judicial resources.  The opponents’ 
primary concern of a violation of due process would also be 
alleviated, as every Markman ruling would be subject to the 
Federal Circuit’s rigorous review.  Therefore, collateral estoppel 
effect should not be granted to Markman rulings subsequently 
followed by a settlement agreement unless the rulings become 
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subject to interlocutory appeals as-of-right. 
 






